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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The past tew years have witnessed a notable Increase in
investigation of the cognitive processes - the means whereb,.
organiams achieve, retain, and transform information. The
work ot Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) represented a
renewed effort to deal with one ot the simplest and. most
ubiquitous phenomena of cognition: categorl,ing or conceptualizing, The spirit of their inquiry was descriptive. The,. sought
to describe and in a small measure to explain what happens when
an intelligent human being seeks to sort the environment into
signifioant classe. of events so that he may end by treating
discriminably ditferent things as equivalents.
The basis for inferring membership in a class for a
particular object depend.s on the attributes of the object.
The attributes, therefore, serve as signals which tell us the
category of the object. An attribute is any discriminable
feature of an event that is susceptible of some discriminable
variation from event to event. When we say that any attribute
may vary, we imply that any attribute represents a dimenslon
along which one may specif,. values. The attribute of' color may be
represented by the values red, Violet, blue, green, "Etc."

There are continuous gradations along it. Other attributes,
those that var,. discretely, bave no such continuity. The
simplest discrete attribute dimension is a binary on, and this
t7Pe is very common. A woman is married or not married, she is
dead or alive, "Etc."
A range of values ma,. also serve to detine the exemplars at
a category. For example, one ot the defining attributes ot the
fruit orange is color. The positive value of the attribute is a
range of colors trom orange-,-ellow through red-orange. There are
man,. discriminable hues that are "acceptable" as signals that
the round object betore one is an orange and is thus discriminable
from other classes of things as lemons and grapefruits. The
width of the range of positive values of an attribute that an
individual will accept as a basis tor categorization will vary
from object to object.
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin distinguished between three
category t7Pes: conjunctive, disjunctive, and relational. They
said that it was not usual to inter identity or some other
significate from a single attribute exhibited by an instance,
but trom several attributes taken together. Illness, for example,
is not inferred only from abnormal body temperature, but from a
whole set of clinical signs taken in combination. Attributes or
cues are oombined for making inferences. The principal distinotions, conjunctive, disjunctive, and relational, each involve a
d1fferent mode of combining attributes.
A conjunctive oategory or concept is one defined by the

joint presenoe of the appropriate value of several attributes.
A disjunctive category is one defined by the presence of one
attribute or as well by another attribute. A relatiQnalconoept
/
or oategory is one defined by a speoifiable relationship between
defining attributes. It is sometimes possible to describe the
same grouping or olass of instanoes in terms of two different
combinations of attributes. One way of combining attributes may
prove to be equivalent to another in terms of the groupin8s
that result by use or application, i.e., it may turn out that one
rule for combining attributes may prove to be equivalent to
another.
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin stressed the "invented" or
"oonstructed" nature of a concept or category. The type of
concept a person construots out of the positive instances of the
oategory he has met will determine the way in which he will
categorize new instances encountered. When one learns to categorize a subset of events in a certain way, one is doing more than
simply learning to recognize positive instances encountered. One
is also learning a rule that may be applied to new instances.
The ooncept or category is basically the "rule of grouping" and
it is such rules that one constructs in forming and attaining
concepts. In this sense, conjunotive, disjunctive, and relational
categories are different types of rules for grouping a set of
attribute values for defining the positive or exemplifying
instances of a concept.
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin suggested that disjunctive

conoepts were more diffioult to learn or Identlfy than conjunotIve, although a dlrect comparlson of the two types was not made.
The first systematic investigatlon of posslble difterences In rule
/

difflcul ty was reported by Hunt and Hovland (1960). These researchers studied which of three different rules a subject would
choose it all were consistent with a partlcular grouping of
stimuli. Two of the rules were conjunction (ftand") and disjunction ("and/or"). The thlrd, Galled the relatlonal rule, specifies
a certain relationship such as "greater than" or "equal to,"
between specific stimulus attributes. As an example, one relational ooncept used by these experimenters was, "Same number of
figures in the upper and lower portions ot a stimulus card."
The subject was presented with a series of geometriC designs,
some of which were labeled as negative. The instances were
selected in such a way that the positive class could be described
logically either as a conjunctive, a disjunctive, or a relational
conoept. Which conoept, if any, the SUbject discovered while
inspecting these stimuli, was determined in a subsequent series
of test trials. In the test, the subject was required to pick
out the stimuli which he thought were consistent with (were
positive instances of) the concept illustrated by the original
stimulus. series. Conjunctive and relational concepts were ohosen
with greater frequenoy than disjunotive concepts but did not
d1ffer from each other.
Bourne (1966) interpreted frequency of choice as an
indication of the relative difficulty ot each rule or type of

solution. On the basis of the Hunt and Hovland data, Bourne
inferred that relational and conjunctive concepts were easier
than disjunctives. He also raised a few additional qyestions in
his survey of the literature in this area,. For example, he
asked: 1) Will the earne result hold if we look at the learning
process directly rather than require the subject to recognize
positive instanoes after learning presumably has been completed?
2) If the result does hold up under various procedural cOfiditions,
what are the significant contributing factors? 3) Given that
differences in difficulty among rules do exist, are they in any
way affected by practice?
Conant and Trabasso (1964) and Neisser and Weene (1962)
reported evidence related to the first two of these questions.
In the Conant-Trabasso experiment, the subjects were required to
discover the solution to structurally equivalent conjunctive and
disjunctive problems under a seleetion paradigm. All subjects
solved problems of both types, 'presented in oounterbalanced
order. Consistent with the conclusion of Hunt and Hovland,
disjunctive concepts were reliably more difficult to solve than
conjunctive. These researchers were able further to trace at
least part of the difference between rules to the relative
diffioulty of negative and positive instances. In terms of
logioal information, negative instances were more valuable than
positive when the solution was a disjunction while just the
reverse was true tor conjunctive problems. Conant and Trabasso
showed that subjects learned more readi17 to use the information

available in positive instances, thus putting them at somewhat
of a disadvantage in disjunctive problems. From the earlier
results of Freibergs and Tulving (1961), however,

di~ferences

between conjunctive and disjunctive problems would be expected
to lessen or disappear with extensive practice in the use of
negative information. One additional finding in this experiment
was that subjectA' card selections were more redundant
(provided overlapping information) in d.1sjunctive problems.
This also may be due to the difficulty subjects had in understanding the full implications of a negative instance. Because
the information they contained was diffioult to assimilate and
utilize, several stimuli providing essentially the same
information may be required by the subject.
The study reported by Neisser and Weene (1962) was
distinguished by its use of a large variety ot different rules
for forming concepts. These experimenters showed that there
were ten different rules tor generating nominal concepts based
on (at most) two relevant attributes. Further, they indicated
that these rules tell into three structurally difterent levels
of complexity. On Level I are two rules: affirmation - all
stimuli with attribute x are members of the concept; and
negation - all stimuli which do not display attribute x are
members of the concept. On the next higher level (II) were a
set ot rules which specified either a oonjunctive or disjunctive
oombination of two attributes; for example, ftx and y" or
"not x and/or y." Finally, on Level III are oombinations ot two

attributes which involve both conjunctive and disjunctive rules;
for example, "(x and y) and/or (not x and not y)." Successive
levels represented increasing conceptual (or rule) complexity
both in terms of the length of expression and in terms of
hierarchical structure. Concepts at each level were composed of
concepts from the next lower level. Neisser and Weene explored
the learning of concepts at each level on the assumption that
problem difficulty would increase with the structural complexity
of a concept.
Significant changes in difficulty were observed as the
level of concept increased. The outcome was interpreted as
reflecting a hierarchical organization of conceptual processes
within the subject. To attain a complex concept, the subject
must use, and therefore must have attained earlier, some simpler
ooncepts from lower levels. Complex learning and problem solving
is predicated on earlier and simpler learning processes. While
one may question this interpretation on several grounds (there
is no real evidence that the subjects did learn Level III
concepts as a combination of conjunctions and disjunctions),
the fact still remains that rule differences do exist in
significant degree, indicating again the real function of the
rule as an item of knowledge to be discovered and used in any
conceptual tas7l:.
More recently, Haygood and Bourne (1965) compared the
performance of human subjects on four different rules: conjunction, disjunction, JOint denial (only patterns which are neither

A nor B are positive instances of the conoept, where A and Bare
are the relevant attributes), and conditional (if a pattern
contains A th.en it must also containB to be a positiveinstanoe).
There were th.ree different conditions of learning. All subjects
were given a series of five successive problems of the same type
so that practioe and transfer effects could be observed. For
subjects working in the attribute identification condition, the
required rule was explained and illustrated prior

t~

the first

problem and then desoribed again between each successive problem
thereafter. In the rule-learning oondition, the two relevant
attributes were naMed prior to eaoh problem. Neither the rule nor
the attributes were specified in

complete learning. For any

subject, the same rule held for all tive problems, though the
relevant attributesohanged rrom problem to problem. The reception paradigm was used throughout.
Rules differed markedly in diffioulty on problem one, with
conditional and disjunctive rules producing the greatest numbers
of errors and trials to solution. However, these differences
gradually diminished with suocessive problems, indicating that
at least part of the differences among rules ma,. be a function
of their relative familiarity. In general, performanoe was worst
in oomplete learning oonditions. Performance approached perfeotior
over five rule-learning problems; that is, subjects made almost
no errors on the fifth problem for three of the rules. PerformanCE
levels in attribute identifioation and complete learning
oonditions were nearly the same after rive problems. The latter

findIng suggested that the subjects did learn the rules in the
course of training and that remaining differences among the rules
were due to the difficulties each presented for identifying
relevant attributes. It seems clear from this experiment that
differences in rule difficulty arose from both sources discussed
earlier. First, rules differ in and of themselves probably
because subjects are more experienced with some (for example,
conjunotive) than with others (for example, disjunctive). Second,
rules differ because it was analytically or strategically
easier to identify the relevant attributes for some.
The present rosearch was focused on the conditional
conoept. General researoh in the area shows that the conditional
ooncept·is much more difficult than the conjunctive or disjunctiv •
Shephard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) explored the learning and
memorization of six different types of classification, each
oontaining two oategories with an equal number of stimulus
members. Two of the six classifications were based on the
biconditional rule, one involving two, the other three

relevan~

dimensions (Types II and VI respeotively). Their interest was
mainly the effect ot the number of relevant or irrelevant
dimensions on the learning and memorization of classifications.
As the number of relevant dimensions increased (Type II versus
Type VI), the number of irrelevant ones decreased. As such, their
compar·ison provided no unambiguous information about the tormation of the conditional concept itself.
The first study designed to examine the ettects of irrele-

vant information in non-conjunotive ooncept problems was that
of Kepros and Bourne (1966). Using the bioonditional rule, they
found a linear inorease in problem diffioulty as the number of
irrelevant dimensions inoreased. Haygood and stevenson (1967)
oompared the affects of number of irrelevant dimensions on
oonjunotive, inolusive disjunotive, and oonditional oonoept
formation., In their study, the bioondi tional was omitted because
of its extreme diffioulty. A Simple oonditionalwas used instead ..
The effeot of inoreasing irrelevant dimensions was greater as
rule diffioulty increased with oonditional showing largest
inorease in mean e'::'rors to solution, disjunoti va next largest,
and the oonjunotive rule the least.
A study performed by Laughlin and Jordan (1967) employed
oonjunctive, disjunctive, and biconditional conoepts. J.'or the
oriteria of number of oard ohoioes and time to solution,
disjunotive oonoepts were signifioantly more diffioult than
oonjunotive, but there were no differences between oonjunotive
and bioonditional. Laughlin and JordAn traced the differenoes
partly to the differenoes between seleotion and rooeption
procedures; slnoe Haygood and Bourne used programrl1ed sequences,
subjeots were more likely to draw negative instances useful for
the solution of concept rules other than oonjunctive, than would
be the case

fo~

the selection paradigm. Also. Haygood and

Bourne's four-attribute and three-value ooncept universe oould
be oontrasted with Laughlin and Jordan's six-attribute and
tU:1-value universe; bioonditional concepts could become

relatIvely more difficult than other !;/pes as the number of
values per attribute inoreased.
Jacobson (1967) undertook a study to determine the relative
diffioulty of five conceptual rules under two conditions of
memory demands. Three problems were given to eighty Loyola
University undergraduate stUdents. A

5 X 2 X 3 repeated measures

factorial design was used with the variables: 1) Conoept rule
(oonjunotive, exclusive disjunotive, exclusion, bi.".}onditional,
and conjunottve absenoe), 2)

~1emory

(paper allowed or not

allowed), 3) Problems (three per subjeot). Five response measures
'were used to

measu~'e

the relative diffioulty of oonoepts:

a) card ohoioes to solution, b) focusing strategy, 0) soanning
strategy, d) time to solution in minutes, and e) untenable
hypotheses. In

generH~,

the results showed that conjunctive

concepts were easiest for subjects to attain. Conjunctive
ooncepts were attained most readily as was ref'leoted by eaoh of
the five response measures. Bioonditional concepts were the
most difficult to attain; the biconditional rule featured the
most difficult solution on three response meaoures (card choices,
scanning, and untenable hypotheses). l'he next most diff'ioul t
solution lias e::cclusive disjunction. 'I'he easiest solution arter
conjunctive was oonjunotive absonce. Intermediate in diffioulty
among all the -'?'Illes was exolusion. The finding ths,t bioonditional
and exclusive disjunotion rules represented the most difficult
solutions was consistent vii th previous researoh in the area.
Previous studies in conditional oonoept formation have

either employed the biconditional or ttl: conditional concept in
co.!lparison to other rules such as the disjunctive or conjunctive.
lJ'he purpose of the present study is to concentrate

~Q

the factors

which go into the formation of the oonditional concept itself.
A general selecticn paradigm, described by Bourne (1966),
was set up. The stimQlus population was presented to the subject.
The problem began when the experimenter designated one member of
the population as a positive instance of the concept which must
be discoverec.• On the basis of this information. the subject
guessed what the correct hypothesis was; that is, he stated some
hypothesis about the solution. If the guess was wrong. the
subject himself was allowed to select an instance from the
population and to ask whether it was positive or negative. Once
this question had been answered by the experimerlter. the subject
chose a new instance and revised his hypothesis according to the
new information which he has received. This process continued another instanoe was selected by the subject and categorized by
the experimenter - until the subjeot stated the correct hypothesls;
that Is, the solution. In this first study of the conditional
concept, this procedure was mod.ified slightly. The attribute
identification learning of Haygood and Bourne (196,5) was also
adopted.
Since the emount of information received would be vital to
the su":iject, this variable was made the independent veriable.
~Juro.beI'

of card choices to solution would be the criterion for

problem solving. The more information a subject would receive,

the easier It would beror him to sol\<.; the problem. In the
experimental paradigm, the amount of feedbaok information was
di vided into total and partial t'eedback. In the tota:J, fe'edbaok
condition, the subject was told "Yes" when a positivelnstance
of the conditIonal concept acoltl·ed. Both the "It" and the "'1'hen"
factors were present on the oard. Fe was told "Does-not ... contradict" when the "If" faotor was not present. Under this condition,
the "Then" faotor might or might not be present on the card. Ue
was told

"l~ott

when the oondi tional rule was violated: The "It"

factor wes present on the card; the "Then" factor was absent.
In the partial feeuback oondition, the subjeot was told "Yes"
it' the oonditional rule was exeMplified or not contradioted. He
was told "No" when the rule was violated.
Besidee information on feedbaok, there is a certain amount
of information about the correct hlPothesis giv.enwi th the
subjeot's first oard. Either both faotors of the oonditional
ooncept ("If" and "Then") will be present, both absent, or one
of them will be present. If the first oard oontains both factors
(Yes-Yea), itwlll be affYes" card in both. the total and partial
feedbaok oondi tions. v-lhen the "rf" faotor(No",Yes) or both
faotors (No-Me) are absent on the first oard, it will be a
"Does-not-contradict" in the total, and a "Yes" card 1n the
partial

feedba~k

conditions.

Koeping 1n mind the two types of information, namely on
feedback and on first card, the experimental hypotheses were as
follows:

Hypothesis 1. The greater the am.ount c.':;' feed:lack ini'o.rmation,
tbe fewer the number of care choices before the subjeot solves
the problem.
Hypothesis 2. The gr.eater the al'lount of information on the first
oard, the fewer the number of cclrd ohoices before the subjeot
solves the problem.
~lypothesig

3. An interaction effeot might take plaoe between

amount of feedback information and amount of inforroation on
first card.

N.R. "Solving the problem" means discovering the proper
oonditional

oonoep~.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
SUbjects:

The subjects were 78 Major Seminarians trom the

tollowing three Chicago suburban Major Seminaries: Divine Word
Seminary, Techny, Illinois; Dominican House of Studies, River
Forest, Illinois; Tolentine Center, Olympia Fields, Illinois.
Apparatus:

44 inch white
64 21 X 4 inch cards
The 64 cards represented

The stimulus display was a 28 X

posterboard containing an 8 X 8 array of
drawn in oolored ink with dark outlines.

all possible combinations ot six plus and minus signs in a row.
Bach position had a ditferent color {e.g. first position was
always blue}. The name of the color was the attribute, While the
plus or minus represented the value ot each color; e.g. attribute
red: value: minus. The cards were systematically arranged upon
the display board. For example, the top four rows were blue plus
and the bottom four rows were blue minus.
Procedure:

The purpose ot the different colors and signs

on the sequence board was explained to each subject individually.
This was done in the following way: Color was merely a positioning attribute which turned up in a plus or minus value on each
card on the sequenoe board. It was possible to olassify or
oategorize the oards according to attribute (oolor) and value

(plus or minus). This classification or categorization could be
set up arbitrarily. Certain of the cards on the sequence board
would exemplify the category and certain cards would not. In
other words, it was possible to divide the

64 cards on the

sequence board into those which exemplified the arbitrary
category or classification and those which would not. An example
of this was given to the subject by defining a category with a
single attribute and a single value. The subject was then asked
to name the cards by number which fit the category which we had
arbitrarily set up. It was pointed out that on a single attribute
and value, the board was cut in half: half of the cards exemplified the category and half did not.
The subject was then told that it was possible to define a
category in as many as six attribute. and two value •• The
subject was then given the possibilities of the values of the
two attribute category to which we would limit ourselves today.
The possible value combinations are: ++, --, +-, and -+. After
each possibIlity was given, an example was made up and the
subject was asked to point out by number, all the cards which
the category.
It was then pointed out that what had been called a
"category" or "classification" was the same thing a8 a concept.
Some concepts were simple. They oontained few elements. Others
were more complex. They contained many elements. For experimental purposes, we could construct wither very simple or very
complex concepts with the sequence board. The purpose of the

sequence board was the study of concept fOPmation.
The interest of the present study was in a special type of
two attribute concept, namely, the conditional

conc~pt.The

nature of the conditional concept in terms of "If" and "Then"
factors was explained to the subject. All the possibilities
of the values were pointed out and demonstrated: "If" factor +,
"Then" factor +; "If" factor ., "Then" factor-; "It" factor +,
"Then" factor -; "11'" 1'actor ., "Then" factor +. In each case,
the subject was given an example and asked to choose the cards
on the sequence board by number, which exempli1'ied the conoept.
The subject was allowed to ask questions. At this pOint, the
subject was also asked whether he had any. All questions were
answered at this point.
The task was explained very brie1'ly: on a sheet of paper,
the experimenter had a particular two attribute two value conditional concept written down. The task of the subject was to
find it. The conditional rule, typed on a small index card, was
given to the subject. He was told to keep it and refer to it
throughout the entire task. The conditional rule read as 1'ollows:
"If the card'has a particular value (plus or minus) on one color,
then it must have a particular value on another color in order
to be included in the concept. But if it does not have the
particular value on the 1'irst color, then it does not need to
have the particular value on the second color. Example: 11'
black plus, then yellow plus. (But if black minus, then either
yellow plus or minus.)"

The instructions differed slightly from here on for the
partial and total feedbaok oonditions. In the partial feedback
condition, the subject was told: "The first card is a 'Yes' card."
In the total feedbaok condition, the subjeot was told either:
"The first card is a tYes' card"; or: "The first card is a
'Does-not-contradict' card."
The exaot prooedure was then explained. The subject would
be giyen a oard (which was a "Yes" or "Does-not-contradiot").
He would haye to make the choioe ot: another oard, designating
his choice by calling out the card number. He was allowed to
ohoose any oard on the sequence board. He would be given the
appropriate feedback: "Yes" or "No" on the partial feedback
condition; "Yes," "No," or "Does-not-contradict" on the total
feedback condition. Then the subjeot would be allowed to make a
hypothesis. If the hypothesis was correct, the problem would be
considered solved. If it was not correot, then the subjeot would
have to make another card choice. Then he would be given the
appropriate feedback as after his previous oard choice. Then he
would be allowed another hypothesis. He would be allcwed one
hypothesis per card choice. The idea was to try to solve the
problem in as few card choices as possible. Time was going to be
kept, but time was not an important factor in the experiment.
The subject was told that there were three problems.
The following feedbs.ck information was typed on index cards
available to the subject throughout the experiment. He was
encouraged to refer to the oards during the oourse of his task.

For the total feedback oondition, the information was as follows:
"Yes: A 'Yes' answer to your oard choice means that thd card you
have chosen fits the concept rule because it exempliries it,
/

that is, the correct hypothesis is oontained on the card."
"No: A 'No' answer ;t;o your card choice means that the card
you have chosen contradicts the concept rule. The correct hypothe is 1s not contained on the card. On a 'No' card l the '1f t factor
will be present, but not the 'Then' factor."
"Does-not-contradict: A 'Does-not-contradict' answer to the
card you have chosen means that the card does not fall under the
concept rule. This would occur when the '1f t factor is not present, although the 'Then' factor might or might not be present."
For the partial feedback oondi t'.on, the feedbaok information
was as follows: "Yes: A 'Yes' answer to your card choice means
either: 1) The card fits the ooncept rule because it exemplifies
it, that is, the correct hypothesis is contained on the oard.
2) The card fits the oonoept rule beoause it does not contradict
it, that is the fIf' factor is not present, although the 'Then'
factor might or :might not be present."
"No: A 'No' answer to your oard choice means that the card
you have chosen contradicts the concept rule. The correct
hypothesis is not contained on the card. On a 'No' card the 'If'
factor will be present, but not the 'Then' faotor."
Design:

The design of the experiment was a 3 X 2 X 3

repeated-measures factorial:
Factor 1: Amount of Information onb'lrst Card:

Yes-Yes: The "Xf" 8nd "Then" factors of the solution were
on the first card.
No-Yes: The "If" factor of the solution 'Was not on the first
card, but the "Then n factor was.
No-No: Neither "If" nor "Then" factors of the solution
were on the first card.
Factor 2: Amount of Information on Feedback:
Total: The subject is told "Yelll," "No," or "Does-notcontradict" after each card Choice.
Partial: The subject is told "Yes" or "No" a.fter each card
choice.
Factor 3: Three Problems were given to each subjeot.

CHAPTER

III

/

RESULTS

The data were first analyzed for the dependent variable of
number of oard choices to solution. Although time to solution
was not considered the basic

depend~nt

variable in the experiment

it too was analyzed. Throughout the results section, the following abbreviations are used: C ... Card Choice, F - Feedback, and
P - Problems.

Card Choices to Solution: Tba mean card choices to solution
for the conditional concept are given in Table 1.
Table
Mean Number of

Ca~d

1

Choices to Solution for Three Problems and

Totals over Problems.
Feedback
Total

Partial

N-Y

Y-Y

N-Y

N-N

One:

10.9 11.3 14.2

4.1

9.1

1.3

Two:

10.9

9.3 19.8

1.0 14.0

5.7

Three:

13.8

1.3 13.8

4.0

1.6

Total:

35.6 33.9 41.8

15.7

First Card:

Y-Y

Problem:

1.3

30.4 20.6

Resu1t~

of the analysis of variance for card choioes are given in

Table 2.
Table

/

2

/

Anal,.sis of Variance 'for Number ot: Card Choices to Solution.

Card Choice (0)

2

353.17

M.S.
-176.88

Feedback (F)

1

1850.?8

18$0.28

7.80*

o

2

639.90

319.95

1.35

72

17074.67

237.14

2

200.33

100.16

,,(1

c

4

382.67

95.67

<1

P X F

2

70.01

35.00

..::::1

PXOXF

4

830.28

207.82

Error (W)

144

17271.99

119.94

Source

~

Variance:

X F

Error (B)
ProbleMS (P)
p X

~.!.

F

<1

1.73

*£ <.01
Thus, in terms of the experimental hypotheaes, the results
were as follows:
Hypothesis 1r The greater the· amount of: feedback information,
the fewer the number ot card choices betore the subject solves
the problem. This hypothesis was verified. There was a strong
effect of amount of feedbkck information on the number of card
choices to solution, as total feedbaak required tewer card
choices than partial,

! (1,72)

= 7.80,

~<.Ol.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the amount of information on the first

oard, the fewer the number of card choices before the subject
solves the problem. As is apparent from Table 2, the effect of
first card information on number of card choices was not
significant, ! (2,72)

= <1.

Therefore the seoond hypothesis was

not verified.
Hypothesis 3: An interaction effect might take place between
amount of feedback information and amount of information on
first card. As is apparent from Table 2 card choices, none of
the interaotions were signifioant. Therefore this hypothesis
was not verified.
Time to Solution in Minutes: The mean time to solution in
minutes is given in Table 3. Results of analysis of varianoe
Table

3

Mean Time to Solution in Minutes for Three Problems and Totals
over Problems.
Feedbaok
Partial
First Oard:

Y-Y

N-Y

Total
N-Ii

Y-Y

N-Y

N-N

Problem:
One:

26.6

33.7 41.5

15.0 16.) 21.2

Two:

16.) 15.0 37.4

14.7 16.5 15.0

Three:

20.3 1).6 27.5

9.8 11.8 16.2

Total:

65.4

62.3 106.4

39.5 44.6 52.4

for time to solution are given in Table

4.

As is apparent from

4

Table

Analysis of Varianoe for Time to Solution in Minutes.

-

Card Choioe (C)

2

s.s.
-4061.78

Feedbaok (F)

1

6914.46

6914.46

10.53*

C X Ii'

2

1558.25

779.12

1.18

72

47274.42

656.58

Problems (p)

2

3460.91

1730.56

p XC

343.06

85.19

P XF

4
2

913.12

406.56

p X C X II'

4

1085.34

271.33

Error (VI)

144

42520.01

295.27

Souroe of Varianoe:

Error (B)

.!!.!..

H·!·

-II'

2030.89

3.09

5.86**
<1
1.37
<1

*£< .01.
**E.

-« •01.

Table 4, the analysis of variance for mean time to solution
paralleled the analysis of variance for mean number of oard
choioes. The effeot of feedbaok information was signifioant in
te~s

of less time for the total over the partial feedbaok

information oondition,

! (1,72)

= 10.53,

E.

~.Ol.

In

te~s

of

information on first card, the differenoe between the total and
partial feedback information oonditions for time to solution
approaohed, but did not exoeed the oritioal value of
at the .05 level of signifioanoe,

! (2,12)

l (3.12)

= 3.09.

ditferenoe between problems in terms ot minutes per problem was

significant at the.Ol level, ! (2,144) :: 5.86. The results of
Duncan Multiple Range Tests showed that problem one took
significantly more time than problem three (l?

< .01),

while

problems one and two, and problems two and three, did not differ
significantly.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The results of the experiment were quite straightforward.
In terms of feedback information, significantly fewer card
ohoices were required in the total than in the partial feedback
oondition. In terms of information on the first card, however,
there was no signifioant differenoe between the two conditions.
e
In other words, the subject seemed to have bentfited more by
feedback information than by information on the first card.
In explanation, we might further analyze exactly what kind
of information was on the first card. In the partial feedback
condition, the subject was not told what factors of the concept
were on the oard. From the onset, he knew only that the first
card was a "Yes" card. In one case, both factors of the conditional concept were actually on the card. In the second case,
the "If" factor was not present, but the "Then" factor was present. In the third case, neither factor was present. Since the
subject did not know from the onset to which group he belonged,
the first card would not help him muoh.
In the total feedback oondition, the subject only knew that
some parts of the oonoept were present, he did. not know what
they were. For instanoe, when the first card was a "Yes" card,

-£1-

he knew onlY' tha.t the "If" factor and the "Then" factor were
present. He did not know what they were. He could onlY' find
this out bY' comparing the first card with other oard.s. In this
process, he would have to rely large17 on feedback information.
The rirat card in the total feedback condition was a
"Does-not-contradict" card when the "If" factor was absent and
the "Then tt factor present, or when both factors were absent. In
the total condition also, the subject oould 0017 find out what
the actual factors were bY' comparing the first oard with other
oards. Again, he would have to rely largelY' on teedback information. The oontent of the information on first card was amb1guous.
This ambiguity could onlY' be eliminated by uti11zing feedbaok
information. Since previous researoh (Bruner, Goodnow, and
Austin, 1956; Haygood and Bourne, 1965) indicates that the
subject learns the rule as he procedes in solving the problem,
the information on the first card seems too tenuous for him to
grasp at the beginning of the searoh for the solution. We might
conolude that the subjeot would not pay olose attention to the
information on the first card.
The analY'sis of variance for time to solution lends some
support to this viewpoint. SignificantlY' les8 time

ht <.01)

to solution was required in the total than in the partial feedbaok oondition. The foous of the subjeot, in terms of time
oonsumed, was on feedback information. In terms of time oonsumed
on first oard, the differenoe between partial and total feedbaok
conditions only approaohed, but did not reaoh significance at

the

.05

level. In the present experiment, the subject did not

seem to have focused on the first card.
There was a practice effect in terms of time to solution
over three problems, but not in terms of number of card choices.
The subjeot did not make signifioantly fewer card choioes over
the three problems, but he made his choices in less time.
Duncan Multiple Range Teats showed that problem one took significantly more time than problem three, though the differences
between problems one and two, and two and three were not significant. A gradual progress from the first to the third problem
appeared in terms of time only. This effect points to the fact
that the problems or the task itself grew easier after the first
problem. If so, this result is in acoord with the previous
stUdies of Haygood and Bourne (1965) and Jacobson (1961).
Two suggestions tor future research could be made from the
present experiment in regard to information on first card. First,
a clearer delineation of the kind of information on the first
card could be made. The subject could be told the value of one
of the faotors of the solution, for instance, or which of the
factors was present or absent on the first card. Seoondly, a
"No" card or negative instance of the rule could be used as a
first card. Previous research (Freibergs 9.nd Tulving, 1961;
Neisser and Ween., 1962; Conant and Trabasso, 1964) indicates
that a negative instance of the ooncept is more helpful in
solving disjunctive problems such as the conditional, than a
positive insta.nce. Suoh a olear point of referenoe as a first

card might make a significant difference both in terms of number
of card choices and time to solution as regards future research
with the conditional concept.

OHAPTER V
STJMMARY
In order to assess the effect of information on the fov.mation of the oonditional ooncept, the performanoe of 78 Major
Seminarians was investigated in three conditional concept
attainment problems. A 2 X 3 X 2 repeated measures factorial
design was used with the following two information conditions:
total and partial feedbaok, and amount of information on first
oard (Yes-Yes; No-Yes; No-No). There were significantly fewer
oard choices

(~<.Ol)

in the total than in the partial feedbaok

information condition, even though amount of

inro~ation

on the

first card made no significant difference in number in number of
card choices. The analysis of variance for the time factor
paralleled these results except that the time faotor in regard
to information on the first card approached significanoe. There
was a significant difference in terms of time per problem

(£~Ol)

but no effect for number of card choices. Gradual progress was
noted over the three problems not in terms of number of card
choioes, but in terms of time. In regard to

.t'ir~t

oard '.nfomatiol,

two suggestions were made for future reses.rch: First, a olearer
delineation of the type of jnformatlon on the first card; Seoond,
use of a negative instance of the rule as a first oard.

- :;>.J. -
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